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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to explore two main issues. First we study crude oil prices in view of weak-
form efficiency. Thereupon we look into different hedging strategies that could be used to 
stabilize income in a market with high volatility. The data used are crude oil prices of West 
Texas Intermediate between 1987 and 2010. We conclude that the spot crude price and the 3 
month future price for the same oil type are weak-form efficient. The two prices tend towards 
a long-run equilibrium and differences in prices are quickly adjusted. OPEC’s role in the 
market is discussed as a weakness to price efficiency. Based on efficient prices, we find that 
the minimum variance hedging method gives the lowest risk, but a naive hedge ratio is easiest 
to implement in a business strategy for a risk averse management. On the other hand, a risk 
neutral oil company would get a higher added return by merely buy and sell in the spot 
market. By introducing a multiple risks hedging model consisting of price risk and exchange 
rate risk, we suggest that a Norwegian company could reduce its total risk of the portfolio by 
increasing its exposure in the currency market.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Our motivation for writing this thesis is partly due to the recent financial crisis. The oil price 
has been very volatile the last years, resulting in incentives for both buyers and sellers to 
hedge against these fluctuations. For Norway, a net exporter of oil, a high oil price is 
favorable as this result in increasing revenues for the Norwegian oil companies, and the 
Norwegian government. We therefore focus on the supply side of the oil market in our thesis. 
Studies show that companies tend to use hedging in futures contracts when the outlook is poor 
and they tend to have no protection when the prospects are good (Knill et al, 2006). If oil 
prices follow a random walk, the prices cannot be predicted. If the management of oil 
companies is risk averse, they should perhaps have a fixed risk profile, regardless of 
expectations.  
 
The efficient market hypothesis has often been attacked by experts and traders who argue that 
the market cannot be efficient when we experience crisis. In the highlight of this we want to 
investigate if the oil price is efficient. We want to look at long- and short term effects of the 
spot and the futures market for oil, in order to establish the relationship between these. It is 
interesting to see whether the physical spot market and the financial futures market differ 
from each other regarding the efficiency hypothesis. We would expect a financial market to 
be efficient. On the other hand, we will suspect that the physical market could be inefficient 
because of OPEC’s dominant position.  
 
The problems for the thesis boil down to two main topics: 1) Is the crude oil markets 
efficient? and 2) In which way should a risk averse management use hedging to face a high 
volatility in the oil market? 
 
We will in this thesis start off by giving an overview of the crude oil market and underlying 
theories which will give a more explicit overview for the further work. In chapter three we 
will carry out the methodology we use. We will use West Texas Intermediate (WTI) prices in 
our empirical research, and the data descriptive will be presented in chapter four. In the 
analyze section we first test the efficient hypothesis. Previous studies done by Green and 
Mork(1991), Gjølberg(1985) and Gülen(1998) show that empirical studies have different 
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results on efficiency in the oil markets. We therefore find it interesting to include more recent 
observations which contain highly volatile periods to test for weak-form efficiency.     
In the second part of the analyze section we study different strategies with respect to the price 
risk. Our main focus will be the naïve and the minimum variance hedging strategy. In the last 
part we will also include the exchange rate risk in our models. To finalize we will compare 
the models using hedging effectiveness, but also look at the added return and the portfolio’s 
risk.     
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2 Theory 
 
2.1 Overview of the oil market 
 
To get a clearer picture of the content of this thesis, we start off by presenting the 
development of the crude oil price in the past and also give an overview of the situation today. 
This information gives a foundation for further understanding our analysis and results.  
 
2.1.1 The oil market in a historical perspective 
  
Before we start analyzing the oil market and the futures market for oil it can be worth 
mentioning some of the extraordinary periods in the oil market. The development in the oil 
prices from 1970 to 2010 is shown in Figure 2.1. Crude oil is traded in barrels and U.S. 
dollars are the main currency. One barrel of oil equals approximately 159 liters.      
 
 
Figure 2.1: Shows historical nominal crude oil prices. Yearly prices are used from 1970 to 1987, and monthly 
prices from 1988 until today.  
 
In the 1950s and 1960s the real oil price was relatively stable around $3 dollar per barrel, but 
the 1970s and especially in 1973-74 marks a watershed. Since 1970 the oil price has been 
subject to several major breaks; it rose dramatically in 1973-75 and again in 1979-81 and fell 
steeply in 1986. Since the 2000 the prices has been increasing significantly, but the prices fell 
sharply during the financial crises.   
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The establishment of OPEC 
 
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was created at the Baghdad 
Conference in Iraq in September 1960. The organization was founded with the purpose to 
limit the supply in order to keep prices high. The members of OPEC meet on a regular basis 
to set production quotas, in order to influence the price. (Rousseau, 1998) 
Yom Kippur War 
In 1970 the demand for oil began to outstrip the production. As the world market for oil got 
tighter the Arab countries started to use the oil power to achieve economic and political 
objectives. This development peaked in 1973 when Egypt and Israel went to war. Saudi 
Arabia refused to increase production in order to halt rising prices unless the U.S. backed the 
Arab position. OPEC agreed to set a new and much higher price for oil amongst the member 
countries (from 3 dollars to 11.65 per barrel). This was a major rise in prices and affected the 
oil importing countries significantly. (Rousseau, 1998) 
Iraq – Iran War 
The second oil price shock was a fact when the outbreak of the war between Iraq and Iran 
started in 1980. During the war period almost 4 million barrels were removed from the world 
market on a daily basis. That was 15 percent of total OPEC output and 8 percent of the world 
market. In 1980 OPEC decided to set the oil price at a new higher level at thirty six dollar per 
barrel. However, the crisis did not last very long since the other oil producing countries 
maintained a high production during the period.  (Rousseau, 1998)   
 
High exports 
In the 1980s the Saudi Arabian exports started to pick up, and so did the total supply of oil. In 
early 1986 the market was flooded with oil and the oil price dropped drastically and hit a low 
point close to $10 per barrel in the summer of 1986, a drop by more than one half from a year 
earlier. (Rousseau, 1998)  
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The Financial Crisis 
 
From 2003 to the middle of 2008, the prices increased approximately 450%.  In the fall of 
2008 the financial crisis started, which not just affected the stock market, but also the 
commodity market and the rest of the economy. Oil prices were quoted at $ 146 per barrel on 
3 July 2008. Oil demand and oil prices fell sharply back the same autumn in the wake of U.S. 
economic recession and financial crisis. On Christmas Eve in 2008, the oil price fell down to 
$ 36.6 per barrel. This was one of the largest drops in the history of the oil price and resulted 
in huge losses for many oil companies worldwide. (IEA, 2010)  
 
2.1.2 The oil market today 
 
OPEC’s role and position 
“In accordance with its Statute, the mission of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) is to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its Member Countries 
and ensure the stabilization of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, economic and 
regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers and a fair return on 
capital for those investing in the petroleum industry”(OPECs homepage, 2010)   
The member countries of OPEC meet on a regular basis to discuss the price level and 
production. OPEC's influence on the market as a cartel has been widely criticized, since it 
became effective in determining production and prices. OPEC's ability to control the price of 
oil has diminished somewhat, due to the subsequent discovery and development of large oil 
reserves in Alaska, the North Sea, Canada, the Gulf of Mexico, the opening up of Russia, and 
market modernization. However, OPEC has 76% of the worlds discovered oil reserves (BP, 
2009).  
OPEC Secretary General Abdalla S. El-Badri says that OPEC has the reserves that is needed 
and is further investing in new capacity. As OPEC go to 2020 they will double their 
investments. This will increase the production capacity by 9 million barrels a day. OPEC 
would like to have excess capacity on standby. This is because they want to use it as a 
safeguard against any disruptions according to OPECs strategy. (E&P Magazine 20/1, 2008) 
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OPEC has been reliable, responsible and ready to ensure the needs of the market and to react 
against any dangerous fluctuations of the prices. OPEC want to joint co-operation with all 
producers and consumers countries as well as to share the risks, but also the profit, a 
reasonable and fair profit with all the actors of the world economy. (Khelil, 2002) 
Since the 1970s, international policy in relation to petroleum has been dominated by OPEC 
and the International Energy Agency, IEA. The recent developments have strengthened OPEC 
with high incomes and two new member states, Angola and Sudan. OPEC's success in 
stabilizing the oil market indicates that major exporters such as Russia, Norway and Mexico 
have an interest to cooperate, which has also been the case historically. (UD) 
In the long term, the world will most likely switch to OPEC. In 2000, OPEC held 
approximately 79 per cent of the world's crude oil reserves and yet accounted for only 42 per 
cent of its crude production. This imbalance will after time correct itself. OPEC's World 
Energy Model forecasts a rise in world oil demand from around 76 million barrels per day in 
2000 to 106 million barrels per day 2020. (Khelil, 2002) 
 
Towards efficiency in the oil market 
As discussed in the previous section we have established the important role and position of 
OPEC. When we further want to test for efficiency in the crude oil market it is necessary to 
accommodate that OPEC set a production quanta, which has a great influence on the crude oil 
price. This is a contrary to the theory of efficiency where the prices are based purely on 
demand and supply. Even if we find a tendency towards efficiency we should be careful in 
our conclusion.  
The futures market is on the other hand a financial market, where most of the contracts are 
paper contracts with no physical delivery. Even if the underlying asset is the crude oil it will 
be more appropriate to run our analysis for efficiency in this market. We will however test 
both markets for efficiency, but accommodate for the effect of OPEC and the production 
setting. 
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2.2 Crude oil pricing theory 
 
To understand the formation of the crude oil price, it is of importance to look at different 
theories that attempt to explain the price. We will derive and discuss several factors that are 
central to the price and price movements of crude oil.    
 
2.2.1 Return to storage and expected prices 
 
To derive future prices of crude oil, we will start to look at a basic approach to explain the 
price according to returns to storage. An investor borrows money at time t and buys Q barrels 
of crude oil at the price St. The investor has the possibility to store each barrel of oil at the 
price Ct. The investor then borrows totally (St+Ct)Q from the bank, and pays back with 
interest the sum of (1+it)(St+Ct)Q, where it is the loan’s interest rate. At time t+1 the investor 
can sell each barrel of crude oil at price St+1. The investor will profit from the investment if: 
(St+1)Q > (1+it)(St+Ct)Q    (2.1) 
St+1 is unknown, but the investor expects of the price to be Et(St+1) at time t. The investor will 
buy oil and store it whenever  
Et(St+1) > (1 + it)(St + Ct)    (2.2) 
Given the inequality above, risk neutral investors will buy physical oil today and store it 
because they will gain profit from this action according to their expectations of the future 
price. Assuming all investors have this same expectation of the future price, they will all want 
to buy physical oil today, and the demand for oil will increase and thereby the price at time t 
will also increase, St>0. The supply of oil at time t+1 will increase, and the investors 
therefore expects a lower spot price at time t+1, Et(St+1)<0. This process will continue until 
we reach equilibrium where Et(St+1) = (1 + it)(St + Ct).      
If we look at the opposite inequality, Et(St+1) < (1 + it)(St + Ct) where the right side is the 
greatest, the investor will lose money by storing oil. In addition to the physical storing cost, 
Ct, some investors find it convenient to have oil in storage. This “negative cost” must be 
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subtracted from the cost of carry, CoC = itSt + (1+it)Ct. The net cost of carry is then C
#
t= itSt + 
(1+it)Ct - t, where  is the convenience yield. (Hamilton, 2008) 
Convenience yield is an expression of having a commodity on hand. The reason why an 
investor may find it convenient to have a physical commodity, and not just as a futures 
contract, is in case of unforeseen events like war, politic regime shifts, natural disasters, etc. 
Lin and Duan (2007) found that the convenience yield of WTI crude oil is highest in the 
summer, while Brent crude oil is highest in the winter. The reason for this is that WTI is more 
sensitive to high demand in the summer months, while the convenience yield for Brent is 
higher in the winter because of the sensitivity of supply.  Another interesting result is that the 
convenience yield may explain the price spread between WTI and Brent. On the other hand, it 
is well known that the different oil prices reflect the quality and transport costs of the crude 
oil.         
In equilibrium of holding one unit of the crude oil one period, the following equality should 
hold: 
Et(St+1) = St(1+it) + (1+it)Ct - t ⇔ Et(St+1) = St + C
#
t   (2.3) 
The implication of this equality is that big changes in the crude oil prices should be mostly 
unpredictable (Hamilton, 2008). If our beliefs are that the crude oil market is unpredictable, 
we will expect that the prices follow a random walk process. We will discuss this further in 
chapter 5.1. 
 
2.2.2 Demand for crude oil  
 
Oil products are vital in society of the world today. Crude oil is being used for making 
products as gasoline, diesel fuel, asphalt, lubricant oil and petrochemicals. Demand for such 
products and other petroleum products stands for a huge market in the modern world.  
In 2009 the demand for crude oil worldwide was 84.8 million barrels per day, according to the 
International Energy Agency (IEA). Demand in OECD countries declined by 4.4% from 2008 
to a total demand of 45.5 million barrels per day in 2009, or 54% of the total demand.  
14 
 
For 2010 it is projected a total demand for crude oil to increase by 1.9% to 86.4 million 
barrels per day. Demand in the OECD is expected to be on the same level as in 2009, while 
the increase in 2010 mainly expected to come in China, the Middle East and the rest of Asia. 
This indicates a higher pressure on the demand side since Asia is becoming more and more oil 
dependent. The International Monetary Fund, IMF, expects in the World Economic Outlook 
(2009) that the demand of oil will increase as industrialization continues in emerging and 
developing economies. It is primarily the emerging economies which IMF expects will return 
to a robust growth, as the growth should remain subdued in advanced economies. However, to 
accommodate for future oil demand, a capacity expansion is needed.  
 
2.2.3 Supply and production of crude oil 
 
Oil reserves are generally owned by countries. Crude oil is non-renewable resource and the 
owners of an oil field must deal with the dilemma of extracting the oil now or later. The 
owner can leave the oil in the ground in the purpose of extracting it later in time, at a higher 
price. The marginal opportunity cost imposed on future generations by extracting one more 
unit of oil today is known as the scarcity rent. The Hotelling’s rule, published by Harold 
Hotelling in 1931, gives the optimal extraction speed of a non-renewable resource. 
Hotelling’s rule says that the scarcity rent, which is the spot price less the marginal production 
cost, rises at the same rate as the interest rate. (Hamilton, 2008) This could by expressed by:  
δt = Pt – MCPt  Pt+1 – MPCt+1 = (1+it)(Pt – MCPt),  (2.4)   
where δ is the scarcity rent, P is the price, MCP is the marginal production cost and i is the 
interest rate. The principle of the theory is that the present value of extracting one unit of a 
non-renewable resource is the same at any given time and that at the resource is just 
exhausted when the time reaches infinity. (Livernois and Martin, 2001)  It is important to 
notice that the scarcity rent changes over time as the prices and the marginal production cost 
changes.  
The problem with theory trying to estimate producer’s optimal extraction rate is that nobody 
know exactly how much oil there exists under the earth’s surface. It is estimated that OPEC 
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have 76% of world’s total oil reserves in 2008. (BP, 2009) This clearly represents a market 
power of the OPEC countries.  
The total supply of crude oil in 2009 was 86.6 million barrels per day. OPEC produced 29 
million barrels per day, which stands for 33.5% of the total supply. On the other hand, OECD 
supplies 22.4% and are a net importer of oil.  
 
2.2.4 The elasticity of the crude oil market 
 
In figure 2.2 below, the production and consumption from 1998 to 2008 is presented. As we 
can see, the consumption has been increasing until 2008. The differences between the 
production and consumption are accounted for consumption of non-petroleum additives and 
substitute fuels, such as fuel ethanol and biodiesel. (BP, 2009) A higher demand of oil 
products may be an explanation for why the oil price today has increased since the 
millennium. 
Oil production and consumption 
 
Figure 2.2: Shows the daily oil production and consumption from 1998 to 2008 in thousands of barrels oil. 
Source: BP statistical review 2009 
 
Today oil is the dominant source of energy, but substitutes exist. The advantage of oil today is 
that it is much cheaper than alternatives such as solar power. As the earth is running out of oil, 
the price is likely to increase and will sooner or later reach the maximum level where oil is no 
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longer competitive compared to its substitutes. This price ceiling is known as the backstop 
price. (Hanneson, 1998) 
In the short run the demand for crude oil market must be considered to be inelastic.  
Especially the transport industry is heavily dependent on oil products and there are limited 
substitutes to these. For some usages, oil can be replaced by other energy sources, but that 
will in most cases be a time-consuming and costly process. Renewable sources such as wind 
and solar power are inefficient and expensive compared to oil at the present.  
Because of long lead times in developing additional production capacity, the supply side of 
the crude oil market is also inelastic. High investment and operations cost contributes to the 
inelasticity of the supply.   
 
 
Figure 2.3: Example of elastic and inelastic market illustrated with a shift in the supply curve.  
 
Because the market is relative inelastic in the short run, we expect a more dramatic price 
volatility with changes in demand or supply. This is illustrated in figure 2.3 above. In recent 
years the price has been more volatile, especially if we are looking at the real price of crude 
oil (Hamilton, 2008).  
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2.2.5 The crude oil price and the US dollar  
 
The fact that the crude oil mainly is traded in US dollars makes the crude oil price sensitive 
for changes in the exchange rate of US dollars. Only 11% of the production of oil takes place 
in United States of America, and the nation stands for 25,6% of the consumption (BP statistics 
2009). Although US dollars are a common used currency in the global economy, the exchange 
rate contributes to an increased risk for crude oil traders worldwide.  
 
According to the IMF World Economic Outlook (2008), the US dollar contributes mainly to 
the crude oil price through two channels.  
The first channel is the purchasing power parity (PPP) channel. Theory of PPP says that the 
domestic price level Pt is equal to the exchange rate St multiplied with the foreign price level 
Pt*, Pt=StPt*, in terms of nominal prices. A depreciation of the US dollar makes the crude oil 
less expensive for consumers of other currencies. A lower price will in the next phase result in 
an increased demand. In the view of suppliers of oil, a depreciation of the US dollar will lead 
to a reduced profit in terms of other currencies. A typical Norwegian oil producer will thereby 
be affected in this way, because its cost will be in NOK and its income in USD.  
The second channel is the asset channel, which reflects an investor risk by holding financial 
assets in US dollars. A depreciation of the US dollars will thereby reduce the return from 
these assets in another currency, and increases the risk of inflationary pressure in the United 
States, and may force investors to use commodities, such as crude oil, to hedge against 
inflation. (IMF, 2008) 
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2.3 The Efficient-market hypothesis 
 
One of the most important foundations for economic theory is the efficient-market hypothesis. 
An efficient market is a market in which prices always fully reflect all available information. 
This means that it is never possible to beat the market by making analysis based on the 
information available, and there is no information not known to everyone in the market. If 
there had been information that was not priced into the share, market participants would have 
immediately seen the opportunity and gained advantage of this until it was no longer 
profitable. 
  
It is common to distinguish between three main forms of market efficiency: weak form, semi-
strong form and strong form. (Bodie et al, 2008) 
 
Weak-form efficiency 
Market efficiency in weak form implies that prices reflect all information stored in historical 
data. The prices are changing randomly, regardless of the price of the preceding days. This is 
called a random walk. At weak efficiency it will not be possible for an investor to find shares 
that are under-or over-valued by analyzing historical data. Technical analysis will therefore be 
a waste of time. 
 
Semi-strong-form efficiency 
Market efficiency in the semi strong form includes all the characteristics of weak form, in 
addition, prices reflect all available public information. This means that investors know 
everything about the company's values and future earnings. As soon as new information is 
published, this will immediately be integrated in the stock price, so it will never be possible to 
make money based on the stock price deviates from the correct price for the stock. In such a 
market fundamental analysis will be redundant, since the results of this will already be 
calculated into the share price. 
 
Strong-form efficiency 
The final form of market efficiency is considered to be very extreme, and seems more like a 
utopia than something that is possible to achieve in reality. At strong efficiency the market is 
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both efficient in weak form and semi-strong form, in addition all private information is also 
priced in. Thus, all the relevant information has already been taken into account, including the 
information that has not been published yet. No one can thus profit by trading on inside 
information. It can be debated whether this form of market efficiency can be achieved, since 
private information is not widely available. However, there exist strict rules for insider 
trading, so the possibility of making use of private information to achieve an excess return is 
limited from a legal point of view. 
 
These main forms of efficiency are also valid for commodities.   
 
2.3.1 Critics of the efficient-market hypothesis 
 
As mentioned earlier, the EMH states that the market always is rational in various forms. This 
statement has taken a lot of critics lately because of the financial crisis. Experts are saying that 
the market can’t be rational when we see such a huge and sharp fall in market prices over a 
short period of time.   
 
Burton G. Malkiel is a well known professor who is especially known for his book “A random 
walk down wall street”. Malkiel is a strong believer of the efficient market hypothesis and 
says that the sharp fall is just a combination of many small negative happenings. When the 
market becomes aware of the fact, this results in a sharp drop in prices. He does not discard 
behavioral theories and technicians but he states that if there is a possible effect that enables 
investors to make an additional earning above the market return, this is just a temporary 
advantage that disappears over time. (Malkiel, 2007) 
 
2.3.2 Manipulated oil price 
 
Due to the recent turbulence in the crude oil market, some have argued that the oil price has 
been manipulated by large market participants.   
When oil prices reached an all time high last summer to $147 a barrel, the biggest corporate 
casualty was oil pipeline giant Semgroup Holdings, a $14 billion (sales) private company in 
Tulsa, Oklahoma, USA. They held short positions in crude oil equal to 20 percent of the 
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nation’s crude oil reserves. People that now work to clean up the financial mess, state that 
there is evidence of a manipulation of the oil price. The oil price has been manipulation by 
traders to create a short squeeze to push up the price of West Texas Intermediate crude to the 
point that it would generate fatal losses in Semgroup's accounts. Some of the biggest 
investment banks like Citibank, Merrill Lynch and especially Goldman Sachs had knowledge 
about Semgroup's trading positions from their vetting of an ill-fated $1.5 billion private 
placement deal in spring 2008. When the oil peaked in 2008 Semgroup could no longer stand 
the pressure and went bankrupt. Investment banks that were short in Semgroup earned a huge 
profit from this. 
 (Forbes, April 13
th
, 2009) 
 
2.4 Futures  
 
Forward and futures contracts are traded in the market with the purpose of obtaining a fixed 
price for a quantum of a specific asset in a given time ahead.  In aim to reduce risk, as well as 
speculate in and even arbitrage, forward and futures contracts are being used.  
The approach with forward and futures contracts could be looked upon as an alternative to 
storage of crude oil as described above for hedging risk. 
The difference between a forward and a futures contract is the conditions of contract terms. 
Futures contracts are standardized and are exchange traded. Forward contracts are individual 
OTC, over-the-counter, contracts between two parties, and less standardized than the futures 
contracts. The futures contracts are settled daily and normally closed out prior to maturity.  
 
2.4.1 Futures prices 
 
The price of a future contract must be lower than today’s price plus interest rate and cost of 
carry, or else it will be cheaper to hedge by storing the oil: 
Ft,t+1 < St(1 + rt) + CoCt    (2.5)    
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The convenience yield, which always is positive, must be taken into account and subtracted 
which makes the equilibrium price of futures contracts.  
Ft,t+1 = St(1 + rt) + CoCt -     (2.6) 
A large convenience yield, , will make the today’s futures price higher that the spot price, 
Ft,t+1 > St, and the market is contango. Normally the convenience is small so the market has 
backwardation.  Today we experience a contango market, which is illustrated in figure 2.4. 
The futures price may differ from an investor’s expectation of spot price in the future, Ft,t+1  
Et(St+1), and Hamilton (2008) adjusts this by adding H
#
t: 
Ft,t+1 = Et(St+1) + H
#
t,     (2.7) 
where H
#
t is a risk premium. 
 
2.4.2 Where to buy futures 
 
On the futures exchange you may trade in both 
futures and futures options. The two largest stock 
exchanges are New York Mercantile Exchange 
(NYMEX) and ICE Futures in London. A 
standard contract here is based on the buy of 
1000 barrels with delivery on a future date. 
Currently (March 2010), one can buy oil for 
delivery up to and including 2018. Options can 
be written in many ways. A common example is that an oil consumer pays a premium for the 
right to buy oil at a fixed price at a future date. The option will only be exercised  
if the future option price exceeds the pre-agreed price.  
 
The NYMEX and ICE exchanges are competitors, but each of them dominates trade within a  
certain type of oil. The most traded contract on the NYMEX for delivery of light, sweet  
North American crude oil is West Texas Intermediate (WTI). Benchmark contract  
 
Light Sweet Crude Oil Futures 
Product Symbol CL 
Barrels Volume 159 liters 
Minimum Fluctuation $0.01 per barrel 
Settlement Type Physical 
Contract Unit 1,000 barrels 
Price Quation U.S. Dollars  
Table 2.1: Crude oil futures contracts 
specifications at NYMEX.  
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by ICE is a different light, sweet crude oil, namely Brent.  
 
There are other exchanges that offer trading in oil-related contracts, mainly  
Tokyo Commodity Exchange (TOCOM). In June 2007, the Dubai Mercantile Exchange 
opened, and benchmark contract that is offered here is sour crude oil produced in the Middle 
East. 
The futures trading on NYMEX is done through a Central Counterparty (CCP). The Central 
Counterparty matches the buyers and sellers and make sure that all parts get their payments. 
This implies that the traders don’t expose any credit risk for each other. Traders are therefore 
protected by the CCP if the other part goes bankrupt. To offer this service, the CCP charges 
margin payments, a percentage of the total transaction, in order to carry the credit risk. 
From figure 2.4 we see the prices of newly traded future contracts with maturity until 
December 2018. We observe that the future contract for delivery in November 2010 is traded 
for $84. The following years is characterized by an increasing oil price. This implies that the 
market expect a higher oil price in a longer time perspective or requires a very high risk 
premium, H
#
t. 
 
Figure 2.4: Illustrates the future price for WTI untill december 2018.  
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2.4.3 Market participants 
 
There are a multitude of players in the oil market, each with different objectives and  
investment horizons. Larger commercial oil companies are involved in higher or lower  
degree, where the most active companies are involved on both the buyer and seller side. Oil 
companies have expert knowledge of producing and manufacturing various oil products, 
which could be said to give them an information advantage in many trades. Sometimes the oil 
companies act in hedging contracts around their delivery dates. In next two sections we will 
look into oil companies’ use of oil price hedging contracts.  
National oil companies in both the Middle East and Latin America are participating in the 
OTC market, but only to a limited extent, suggesting that they seldom hedge future oil 
production. Investment banks are intermediaries, and also take their own risks, such as when 
they incur risk from a seller of oil, without having to immediately find a new buyer who is 
willing to take the risk.  
 
Hedge funds have increasingly been active in the oil market in recent years. Several sources 
have alleged that the hedge funds' speculation in oil derivatives has contributed to the high oil 
prices we have seen in lately, as discussed in section 2.3.5. Hedge funds usually take positions 
in the most liquid segments of the oil markets, so that positions quickly can be terminated if it 
would be necessary. In general, hedge funds contribute to an increase in arbitrage-related 
activities. For example, a hedge fund could speculate that a previously observed price ratio 
between two assets will be re-established. The oil market gives hedge funds and other traders 
many opportunities to speculate on price differences between different petroleum products or 
types of crude oil. Some of the major global consumers of oil such as airlines and other 
transport are also trading in the future market for oil. A recently released report states that 
most airlines will hedge at least part of its needs for fuel (Morell and Swan, 2006). 
 
2.4.4 Why use hedging contracts 
 
In a general perspective a company is risk neutral and the owners are risk averse. This will in 
other words say that the company is only interesting in maximizing profit and will not seek to 
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hedge production in order to reduce risk. There are however exceptions in the real world. A 
typical example is when a principal agent problem occurs. The essence of the agency problem 
is the separation of management and of ownership and control (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
The owners want return on the capital they invest and they need to ensure that the company 
does not waste their investments. This can be a problem if there are not specified contracts 
between the two parts. Managers need to be given the right incentives for choosing the risk 
management policy preferred by owners of the company (Chang, 1997). If there is a strong 
ownership structure in the company, this can give reduced power to the management in solely 
focusing on maximizing the return. A manager that is afraid of losing his job and reputation 
will act thereafter. If the shareholders are risk averse they can demand that the management 
focuses stronger on hedging to eliminate unsystematic risk that the company is exposed to.    
It is important to stress that an oil company can only hedge away the unsystematic risk. 
Systematic risk such as government policy, wars, collapse of a financial system etc. cannot be 
eliminated by any hedging strategy. 
If Miller and Modigliani’s perfect financial markets hold, hedging will not be useful. In 
imperfect markets there is however a possibility that hedging may contribute to a company´s 
value by influencing investments decisions, expected costs of financial distress or expected 
taxes. (Haushalter, 2000) We see that several oil companies use hedging consequently in their 
risk management strategy. This tells us that there must be some advantages with 
implementing such strategies. Below we have listed some of the reasons why companies use 
hedging contracts. 
 Robustness  
Hedging will give a company an advantage compared to its competitors if the oil price should 
drop. The robustness they today achieve by being completely financed by equity could also 
been realized by locking in their revenues in the futures market. A drastic drop in the oil price 
could then give the hedging company a golden opportunity to act countercyclical in 
acquisitions.  It is a big advantage with equity instead of debt when the company faces a 
downturn in the market they operate in. 
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Stability 
A company that plays an active role in the future market will experience lower grade of 
uncertainty. This will in our point of view result in a gain in operational stability.  The 
reduction of risk will give the company more opportunities when markets are in a downturn 
and they do not have to make drastic changes in the economic structure of the business. An 
“optimal” solution for this problem could be to hedge the price for as long as the oil field is 
active. This will, however, be problematic since there must be someone on the other side of 
the contract who is willing to take the risk of paying a locked-in-price for a long time horizon.   
Marginal oil fields are very sensitive to volatility in prices. With the use of hedging contracts 
the company can ensure the stability to make these projects remain profitable. A risk neutral 
company may in this situation have incentives to hedge the price. This is because it will 
reduce its bankruptcy costs and thereby increase the value of the company.  
 
2.4.5 Oil companies use of hedging contracts 
 
Oil companies that invest in increased production capacity risk that oil prices later will fall  
to a level that makes investment unprofitable. This risk may limit the oil companies urge to 
invest in increased production capacity. Similar problems apply to all business investments, 
but the problem is even bigger for oil companies. This is due to the long period from the 
investment is decided for the first oil barrels produced, 10 years are not uncommon. In 
addition, a relatively large share of production costs that are investment-related, production 
capacity that is invested has little or no alternative forms of use, and the price of oil itself has 
historically high volatility. 
With high price risk, the forward market for crude oil seems to be a good solution for oil 
companies seeking to reduce their risk. An oil company will in theory be able to sell a futures 
contract and in this way "lock" the price it will receive for its future production.  
Trough findings and a personal interview with a big oil company in Norway, we found that 
many of them consequent use short term contracts in their hedging strategy. This is because it 
is more risky to lock in the price for a longer period. The short term contracts (1-3 months) 
are also easier to deal with since they are more liquid and traded in a bigger volume.  
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2.4.6 Downside with hedging 
 
Lack of buyers 
Even if an oil company wants to hedge a larger proportion of its future production by 
selling futures contracts for oil, it is far from certain that there are buyers of such contracts or 
vice-versa. We observe today that the majority of contracts apply to the supply of oil within a 
year. This may mean that investors do not want to commit to hedge the oil price for a longer 
time horizon 
Shareholders want exposure in oil prices  
 
We believe shareholders in oil companies want exposure to the oil price, and it is therefore an 
important reason for management to choose not to enter into long-term price agreements on 
oil. It is difficult for an individual investor to get direct exposure to the oil price through 
positions in the futures market. The future market is primarily aimed at professional investors. 
On NYMEX the minimum contract is 1,000 barrels of oil, which means that at the current oil 
price around $75 you need to take a position of approximately NOK 500 000. Thus, the 
indirect exposure to oil prices by holding shares in an oil company is therefore the best option 
for private investors. 
Tax Authorities 
Even if an oil company would attempt to "secure" investments by entering into long-term  
hedging contracts, a number of other risk factors affect to determine whether the investment  
turns out to be profitable. One of these risk factors is government policy regarding the 
international oil companies, including the taxes companies must deal with. There is no doubt 
that the government's tax policy will be increasingly important for oil companies to deal with.  
International companies, including Statoil, have in recent years been forced to give up control 
of their fields, while the tax and royalties rates have gone up. The point is that fiscal 
authorities changing the tax regime represents a very significant risk that an oil company 
cannot hedge against. In addition, many international companies that extract oil as partners 
with national oil companies are already subject to contracts that are comparable with the 
hedging contracts. It is not unusual that companies have contracts that regulate the maximum 
price they receive per barrel of oil. The government receives the excess revenues if  
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oil prices would go above this level. In return the company receives such tax cuts if the oil 
price were to go under a prior agreement to the floor. 
 
Focus on the upside rather than downside 
A seller of oil that hedge the price at a favorable time, will be better off if the price drops. But 
the oil company may risk losing profit as a result of increasing oil prices. Management might 
be more concerned with the fear of bad timing, rather than the benefits of a good agreement. 
For the national oil companies, this risk aversion is particularly strong. No CEO wants to be 
remembered as the one who sold the national wealth for cheap money. 
 
There are plenty of examples of oil companies that have signed hedging agreements that in a 
retrospect proved to be very unfavorable for them, but favorable for the counterparty. Saga 
Petroleum ASA, which in 1999 was acquired by Hydro, is an example of this. The company 
found itself in a financial squeeze in 1998 in a market where the oil price had reached a new 
bottom level. They chose to hedge the price in fear that the oil price should fall further and 
thereby bring them even closer to bankruptcy. Not long after they had entered into long-term 
hedging contracts, the market turned. While other oil companies experienced the "joy ride", 
Saga had committed them to sell oil at very low prices. (Andrén and Jankensgård, 2008) 
 
2.5 Futures hedging strategies 
 
The basic idea with hedging is to reduce risk, and a perfect hedge is one where risk has been 
totally eliminated.  A perfect hedge is though never achievable. Strategies with futures 
hedging are constructed to perform close to a perfect hedge. (Hull, 2009) 
A business or investor who seek to hedge, are generally doing it in the purpose of not being 
exposed to the price variations in the market. A hedge can counteract an unpleasant surprise 
of, for example a shock in commodity price of a necessary part of the final product to a 
company. With hedging, a producer using a commodity in the production can rather focus on 
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making the product than worry about the spot price. However, hedging may lead to big losses 
of income. (Hull, 2009)  
An investor may either buy or sell a future contract. A position where a futures contract is 
sold in purposes of hedging risk is called a short hedge, while on the other hand a long hedge 
is when the hedger buys futures contracts. A company or investor who already own an asset 
and plans to sell the asset sometime in the future, may use a short hedge to reduce risk. The 
short hedge can be used by a risk averse management to hedge future income. A short 
position in the futures market is used for the short hedge. The long hedge is used by 
participants in the market who are using a commodity and plans to buy it in the future. Long 
hedge consist of going long in futures contracts. The main argument by hedging the price with 
a long futures contract is to lock in the price. This moves away the uncertainty for the buyer 
of the commodity. A long hedge may also be used if an investor already has a short position 
in the market. (Hull, 2009)  
 
2.5.1 Naïve hedging strategy 
 
A naïve hedging strategy is when the hedger takes one unit of a spot position and an opposite 
position of one unit in the futures market. This is a one-to-one strategy and will always have a 
hedge ratio equal to one. If spot and futures prices move equally, i.e. in the same directions 
and the same amounts, the hedge is perfect because the total value of the portfolio remains the 
same. However, changes in spot and futures prices are rarely equal. Lien et al (2008) did an 
empirical research in Chinese metal market that concluded that the naïve strategy has the 
worst performance.  
 
2.5.2 Minimum variance hedge ratio  
 
The hedge ratio is the amount of futures contract the hedger buys compare to its existing 
portfolio. The optimal hedge ratio is when the variance of the portfolio to the hedger is 
minimized.  
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To prove the formula for the hedge ratio, we will look at an example with a company who 
will sell NS units of spot contracts at time t. To simplify, we will consider the futures contract 
as a forward contract. We therefore assume constant interest rate and no daily settlement of 
contracts.  
The company will hedge the price, and since they are selling the asset, they will use a short 
hedge. They will therefore short futures contracts with NF units of a similar asset at time t. 
The hedge ratio, h, is then:  
              (2.8) 
The company will at time t+1 realize a profit or loss denoted as πt+1, where St is spot price and 
Ft is futures price at time t: 
πt+1  = St+1NS – (Ft+1 – Ft)NF – C = StNS + (St+1 – St)NS – (Ft+1 – Ft)NF – C  (2.9) 
where C is the costs obtaining this portfolio.  
We insert (2.8) into equation (2.9) and get: 
πt+1 = StNS + NS(S – hF) – C,    (2.10)  
where S = St+1 – St and F = Ft+1 – Ft. 
At time t, variables St and NS are known. S – hF is the unknown part of π, which the 
variance must be minimized to minimize the variance of π.  
The variance of S – hF is: 
Var(S – hF) = 2∆S + h
22∆F – 2h∆S∆F  (2.11) 
The first order condition with regard to the hedge ratio is then: 
dVar/dh = 2h2∆F – 2∆S∆S = 0   (2.12) 
which gives us the optimal hedge ratio: 
 
   
   
   
     (2.13) 
By estimating the standard deviation and the correlation for differentiated spot and futures 
prices, we can find the optimal hedge ratio. (Hull, 2009) 
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Instead of using differentiated prices, it is also possible to use the return. In this case we seek 
to minimize the variance of the return of the portfolio: 
                  
                       (2.14) 
This gives us the hedge ratio: 
   
          
       
     
  
  
    (2.15) 
where ri,i=P,S,F, is the return of respectively portfolio, spot and futures and ζi, i=S,F, is the 
standard deviation of the return. (Chet et al, 2003) 
  
 
2.5.3 Optimum mean-variance hedge ratio 
 
A concern with the minimum variance hedge ratio is that it does not focus directly on the 
return, but at the volatility of the portfolio. The optimum mean-variance hedge ratio 
maximizes the utility function with respect to amount of futures contracts: 
                    
    (2.16) 
where E(rP) is the expected return of the portfolio, ζP
2
 is the variance of the portfolio and A is 
a risk aversion parameter. This gives us the hedge ratio: 
     
  
  
 
     
   
      (2.17) 
If the return of the futures contract is zero or the risk aversion parameter goes to infinity, we 
see that the hedge ratio is equal to the minimum variance hedge ratio. (Chen et al, 2003) 
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2.5.4 Sharpe hedge ratio 
 
Another hedging method we want to look into is the Sharpe ratio. The Sharpe ratio is a 
measure of the excess return (or risk premium) per unit of risk invested in an asset or a trading 
strategy. The Sharpe ratio is used to characterize how well the return of an asset compensates 
the investor for the risk taken. An investor will choose the combination that gives the highest 
value of the Sharpe ratio. The Sharpe ratio has as its principal advantage that it is directly 
computable from any observed series of returns without need for additional information 
surrounding the source of profitability. (Bodie et al, 2008) 
The portfolio P, now consists of a risk free asset in addition to spot and futures contracts. The 
optimal hedge ratio is computed by maximizing the Sharpe ratio with respect to the amount of 
futures contracts: 
       
        
  
     (2.18) 
Where    is the return of asset i,    is the risk free rate and    is the standard deviation of the 
return to the risky asset. This gives us the following hedge ratio: 
   
 
  
  
   
  
  
  
     
        
      
    
  
  
  
      
        
  
    (2.19) 
As with mean-variance, the hedge ratio equals the minimum variance hedge ratio if the return 
of futures contracts is zero. (Chen et al, 2003) A problem with this approach is that the first 
order condition can minimize instead of maximize the Sharpe ratio. This will occur if the 
Sharpe ratio is continuously increasing with the hedging ratio. The second order condition is 
then not satisfied. (Chen et al. 2001)  
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2.5.5 Minimum variance strategy with two risk factors  
 
A crude oil trader may face both the risk from price changes in the crude oil price and the risk 
of changes in the exchange rates.  
We will consider two models (Yun and Kim, 2010), the first where the hedging ratios of 
crude oil futures and exchange rates are estimated separately and second, a more advanced 
one, where both risk are included in the model. Hereafter we will call the first model 
“separate” and the second “complex”. The models are based on the minimum variance 
approach. 
The separate model will deal with hedge ratios separately, in the same approach as above with 
minimum variance. The difference is that we now transform the prices to local currency, 
NOK. The first hedge ratio, to hedge price changes, is based on the profit or loss, πt, of buying 
futures contracts:  
                                           (2.20) 
where NS and NF are the amount of spot and futures contracts, St are spot prices in USD, et is 
the spot exchange rate and C is costs. πt has the variance: 
           
     
    
     
                 (2.21) 
where ζSe and ζFe are the standard deviation of spot and futures price in local currency and 
ζSe,Fe is the covariance between spot and futures prices in local currency. We get same hedge 
ratio as in 2.5.2, just adjusted for local currency: 
  
          
    
    
     (2.22) 
When only hedging the exchange rate risk, the profit is given by: 
                                         (2.23) 
where NX is the amount of exchange futures contracts and xt is the exchange futures. The 
following variance is: 
           
     
    
    
     
                    (2.24) 
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This gives us the following hedge ratio: 
   
         
    
       
      (2.25) 
hI
*
 and hII
* 
is the hedging ratios for the separate model.  
In complex model, the trader wants to hedge both price risk and exchange rate risk. The trader 
will have following profits from his investments: 
                                                          (2.26) 
which gives us the variance:  
           
     
    
     
    
    
     
                                 
                         (2.27) 
We set    
   
  
 , j=1,2,3, k=1,2, where 1 represent crude oil futures, 2 represent currency 
futures and 3 is crude oil spot. When minimizing the variance, we get following hedging 
ratios:  
    
  
  
 
  
  
 
          
          
 
 
          
          
 
 
               
               
    (2.28) 
   
  
  
 
  
  
 
      
      
 
 
          
          
 
 
 
    
               
               
   (2.29) 
where     
  is the hedge ratio for crude oil futures and    
  is hedge ratio for exchange futures 
in the complex model. (Yun and Kim, 2010) 
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3 Methodology  
 
3.1.1 Random walk 
 
A random walk implies that the correlation between the price change at time t and time t+1 is 
zero. Investors estimate the value of an asset on the basis of their expectations about the 
future, and these expectations are assumed to be unbiased and rational, given information 
investors have at this time. Under these assumptions the price changes will only be a result of 
new information. Information is by definition random, thus it is equally likely that there are 
good or bad news, i.e., the price goes up or down. A random walk process is a process of 
change in the value of any time interval which is independent from any changes that has 
occurred in the preceding time intervals, and the size and direction of future changes in the 
value are independent of the past. A market where successive price changes are independent 
is by definition a "random walk" market. In other words: the "random walk" hypothesis states 
that stock price changes have no memory and therefore historical prices can’t be used to 
predict future price changes.  
 
We let    be an economic variable that we observe over time. The variable is random since it cannot 
be predicted with certainty. The economic model which generates the time variable    is called a 
stochastic, or a random, process. A stochastic process is stationary if its mean and variance are 
constant over time, and the covariance between two values from the series depend only on the length 
of time separating the two values, and not on the actual times at which the variables are observed.  
 
AR(1) process                      (3.1) 
 
The autoregressive process with one time lag, AR(1), is stationary if      . If    . The 
AR(1) process reduce to a nonstationary random walk series in which the value of    this 
period is equal to the value      from the previous period plus a disturbance   .  
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Random walk                    (3.2) 
 
A random walk series shows no definite trend, and “slowly” turns one way or the other. If 
    and     the series produced is also nonstationary and is called a random walk with 
drift. 
 
Random walk with drift                    (3.3) 
 
Such series do show a trend and many macroeconomic and financial time series are 
nonstationary. (Hill, 2008) 
 
 
3.1.2 Unit root test for stationarity 
 
It is important to know whether our time series is stationary or nonstationary before we start 
doing regression analysis. This is because there is a danger of obtaining apparently significant 
regression results from unrelated data when nonstationary series are used in regression 
analysis. These regressions are said to be spurious. A spurious regression may indicate 
significant relationship even when there is none, and the results are nonsense. To solve this 
problem we can use models to test whether the series are stationary or nonstationary. 
 
The stationarity of a time series can be tested directly by doing a unit root test. The AR(1) 
model for the time series variable    is, 
 
                    (3.4) 
 
The AR(1) process shows that each realization of the random variable    contains a 
proportion   of last period’s value      plus an error   . We assume that the errors,    is a 
random disturbance with zero mean and constant variance,   
 . The errors are sometimes 
known as “shocks” or “innovations”. If      then    is the nonstationary random walk, 
          , and is said to have a unit root, because the coefficient ρ is equal to one.  
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To test for nonstationarity we can simply test for the null hypothesis that     against the 
alternative that    . To run the test we need to subtract      from both sides of (1.4). 
 
                             
                                    
                                       (3.5) 
 
where              and      . Then we can test the following hypothesis:  
 
                             
               
 
The variable             is called the first difference of the series     If    follows a random 
walk, then     and               . (Hill, 2008) 
 
3.1.3 Dickey-Fuller 
 
In addition to testing if a series follows a random walk, Dickey-Fuller also developed critical 
values for the presence of a unit root in the presence of drift (3.3). Such series display a 
definite trend. 
 It is also possible to allow a non-stochastic trend. The model is then further modified with 
including a time trend, or time t.   
                         (3.6) 
 
The t-statistic must take larger values than usual in order for the null hypothesis       , a unit root 
nonstationary process, to be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis       .  To control for 
the possibility that the error in term one of the equations is autocorrelated, additional terms are 
included: 
                 
 
               (3.7) 
 
where,                  , and                   ,   
 
Testing the null hypothesis that     in the context of this model is called the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test (ADF). (Hill, 2008) 
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3.1.4 Cointegration 
 
As a general rule nonstationary time series variables should not be used in regression model, 
in order to avoid the problem of spurious regression. There is however an exception to this 
rule. If     and    are nonstationary with one unit root variables, I(1), then we would expect 
that their differences, or any linear combination of them, such as              , to be 
I(1) as well. There are however important cases when               is a stationary I(0) 
process, without unit roots. In this case    and    are said to be cointegrated. Cointegration 
implies that    and    share similar stochastic trends since the error term    is stationary, they 
never diverge too far from each other. The cointegrated variables    and    exhibit a long-
term equilibrium relationship defined by           , and    is the equilibrium error, 
which represents short-term deviation from the long-term relationship. 
 
We can test whether    and    are co-integrated by testing whether the errors                      
              are stationary. We cannot observe   , so we therefore test the stationarity 
of the least squares residuals,                , using a Dickey-Fuller test. We estimate 
the regression: 
                      (3.8) 
 
where               , and examine the t statistics for the estimated slope. (Hill, 2008)  
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3.1.5 Error correction model 
 
As emphasized above, cointegration can be related to the idea of x and y trending together or 
bearing a long term equilibrium relationship to each other. A second important task is to 
estimate the long run multiplier or the long run influence of x on y. In some cases you may be 
interested in understanding short-run behavior in a manner that is not possible using only the 
regression of x and y. In these cases we can estimate an error correction model. 
 
A theorem known as Granger representation theorem, says that, if x and y are cointegrated, 
then the relationship between them can be expressed as an ECM.  
 
The error correction model we will use is: 
                       (3.9) 
where      is the residuals obtained for the regression with the cointegrating variables y and y 
(i.e.                  ). ε can be seen as equilibrium error, and if the θ≠0 the model is 
out of equilibrium. If θ<0 the error will be “corrected” in next period, and if θ>0 the error will 
be magnified in the model. We would expect the θ<0 and the value of θ tells us how fast the 
model is moving towards its equilibrium error. (Koop, 2007) 
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4 Data and descriptive statistics 
 
In this thesis we look at weak-form efficiency in the markets and into different hedging 
strategies in the crude oil market, and try to analyze the use of futures contracts regarding the 
optimal hedge ratio and hedging effectiveness. We use figures for both futures and spot in the 
crude oil market and in the exchange rate market. Western Texas Intermediate (WTI) is traded 
in US dollars and we therefore use the exchange rate between US dollars and Norwegian 
Kroner since we focus on a Norwegian oil producer. The time horizon we look at is from 
1987 until 2010. Our study will focus on weekly data for two reasons. Firstly the data is more 
stable than daily data. Secondly, studies suggest that weekly hedges are more eﬃcient than 
daily hedges. (Laws and Thompson, 2005) For the calculations of WTI we use weekly 
numbers, but we use monthly numbers in chapter 5.3 of both WTI and the exchange rates 
USD/NOK. This is because we could not find the future contract figures for the exchange 
rates on a weekly basis. However, we will test daily, weekly and monthly data for efficiency 
in chapter 5.1. The dataset for WTI is found at EIA, U.S. Energy Information Administration. 
The exchange rates were found at Norges Bank, Norway’s central bank, and interest rate is 
found at Bloomberg. The weekly prices for WTI are collected on Fridays or the closest 
trading day. For monthly crude oil prices, the prices are collected the 15
th
 every month or the 
closest trading day. The exchange rates are average monthly figures.  
Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1: Shows the descriptive statistics for the data set from 1987 to 2010 (weekly figures). The returns are 
calculated as logarithmic differences. WTI Futures are 3 month contract.  
 
From table 4.1 we can see that both spot and futures have an average return of 0,12%. We 
also noticed that the standard deviation is higher for the futures contracts if we look at relative 
prices, but is higher for the spot when we calculate the returns in a logarithmic scale. Further 
we notice that the figures are not completely normally distributed. A simple way to test this is 
 
WTI Spot WTI Futures Returns WTI Spot  Returns WTI Futures 
     Mean 33.803 33.795 0.0012 0.0012 
Standard Error 0.687 0.698 0.0013 0.0010 
Standard Deviation 23.719 24.113 0.0437 0.0356 
Kurtosis 3.382 3.059 3.0501 2.5817 
Skewness 1.864 1.815 -0.2161 -0.4999 
Minimum 11 11.64 -0.1923 -0.1843 
Maximum 142.52 143.39 0.2512 0.1518 
Count 1192 1192 1191 1191 
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to see if the skewness and excess kurtosis are zero, as is the case with a normal distribution. 
The skewness and excess kurtosis for the 24 year weekly log spot returns are -0.2161 and 3,05 
respectively. This tells us that the left tail is the longest, it has higher peak at the mean and 
fatter tails. The same conclusion applies for the futures contracts. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Historical oil spot and futures prices (WTI). Illustrates the development of the WTI spot price 
and WTI futures price from 1987 to 2010 (Weekly figures). 
We observe from figure 4.1 that the spot price and future price follow almost the same path. 
This indicates that the future price seems to be an unbiased estimator of the spot price.   
 
Figure 4.2: Illustrates the development of the exchange rate between Norwegian Kroner (NOK) and the US 
Dollar (USD). 
 
The data we use for the exchange rates is based on monthly figures and the future contracts 
for USD/NOK are 3 month contracts. In figure 4.2 we can see the development of the 
exchange rate between the USD and NOK. As we can see, this graph seems to contain less 
sharp price movements than in the oil price. There are however some interesting periods 
where we see major movements in the exchange rates.   
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5 Empirical Analyses  
 
In our empirical analysis we use the data described in chapter 4. First we will look into the efficiency 
of the crude oil prices and then move on to look at hedging in the crude oil market. We have pointed 
out that OPEC work as a cartel and therefore have significant market power. We base our 
analysis on that both the spot and future market for oil is a perfect competition market, where 
demand and supply is decided by the all the market participants. For the spot market this is a 
vague argument since OPEC set the production level on a regular basis. For the future market, 
which is a financial market, the argument would be stronger. 
 
5.1 Efficiency market hypothesis 
 
There are several studies that look at efficiency in the crude oil market. Green and Mork 
(1991) examine the efficiency and integration between the spot and future market. They found 
that the market for crude oil has, at times, produced large and persistent differences between 
the official contract prices and the spot prices. Such differences are not evidence per se of an 
inefficient market, as they may reflect risk or monopoly premia or the institutional fact that 
the contract prices are adjusted only at discrete and infrequent intervals. However, testable 
implications of the efficient-market hypothesis within this setting can be derived. In 
particular, information available at the time the official price was set should not be helpful in 
predicting contract-spot differentials. 
 
In this section we will analyze both the spot market and future market for WTI oil. We will 
look at the whole period and also divide the data into sub periods to test our findings.  
 
5.1.1 Results of unit-root testing 
 
In order to test our hypothesis we need to establish whether the market we analyze is efficient 
or not. We will test if the oil price follows a random walk process. There are several different 
oil markets on a global basis, but we choose to analyze the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 
market. Since this paper only focuses on the WTI market, we assume that other oil markets 
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have the same behavioral pattern as WTI. This indicates that you cannot take advantage of 
mispricing in one oil market and use it to make arbitrage profit in another oil market.  
 
To test for weak-form efficiency we check the WTI prices for unit-roots. As we can see from 
table 5.1 we keep the null hypothesis for all prices which implicates that the prices follow a 
random walk process. We include results with a constant and also with a constant and a trend. 
The null hypothesis is kept on a significant level of one percent for every oil type except for 
the WTI Spot monthly. When we include a trend we reject the null hypothesis on a 5 percent 
significant level. This signalizes that there might be a pattern in prices since they are 
stationary. This is an interesting finding, but the trend is however not significantly different 
from zero. We therefore overall fail to reject that the series are stationary and keep the null 
hypothesis that the WTI spot and futures prices are non-stationary and follow a random walk 
process. We therefore say that there exists a weak-form efficiency in the markets.  
 
Test for stationarity 
                                                        Level First differences 
Oil type Constant Constant & trend Constant Constant & trend 
WTI Spot daily -1.026 -2.580 -29.27** -29.29** 
WTI Spot weekly -1.016 -2.394 -10.86** -10.88** 
WTI Spot monthly -2.038 -3.687* -9.006** -8.991** 
Futures WTI daily                                     -0.767 1.645 -11.46** -11.46** 
Futures WTI weekly -0.772 -2.173 -10.7** -10.73** 
Futures WTI monthly -1.810 -3.163 -7.371** -7.502** 
Table 5.1: Contains the critical values for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Test period is 1987-2010.  
*significant at 5% level, **significant at 1% level. 
 
The lags of the dependent variable used to obtain white-noise residuals are determined using  
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). It is important to try to find it optimal number of lags of 
the explained variable which are to be included in the regression. If we include too few lags 
the auto correlation will not be eliminated and if we include too many lags we will observe 
increased standard deviation in the coefficients. This latter effect occurs because multiple 
parameters in the regression are consuming the degrees of freedom. Given everything else, the 
absolute value of test statistics will decrease, resulting in that the null hypothesis for a unit 
root will be rejected too seldom (Brooks 2005). In other words, we will conclude non- 
stationarity in cases when the time series actually are stationary. 
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5.1.2 Sub periods 
 
We have seen that the spot and futures markets seem to be weak-form efficient for the whole 
period and follow a random walk process. This however does not imply that the markets will 
be efficient in all years or periods. To investigate this we choose three sub periods to analyze. 
The first sub period is from 1990 to 2000 and is a period where the oil price was quite stable 
compared to recent years. The two other sub periods are much more volatile and is 
characterized by a sharp upturns and sharp drops. By doing the same test as before (ADF) we 
want to test whether these sub periods give the same result as for the whole period.  
Test for stationarity 
Constant WTI Spot WTI Futures 
1990 - 2000 -2.493 -2.405 
2000 - 2007 -0.8965 -0.6647 
2007 - 2010 -1.521 -1.577 
Table 5.2: Shows the critical values from the unit root test for the 3 sub periods at weekly data. The results 
include only the constant.  *significant at 5% level, **significant at 1% level. 
Test for stationarity 
Constant & Trend WTI Spot WTI Futures 
1990 – 2000 -2.397 -2.332 
2000 – 2007 -2.357 -2.082 
2007 – 2010 -1.556 -1.600 
Table 5.3: Shows the critical values from the unit root test for the 3 sub periods at weekly data. The results 
include a constant and a trend. *significant at 5% level, **significant at 1% level. 
  
From table 5.2 and 5.3 we observe that we get the same results as for the entire period: We 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the time series is stationary and we conclude that the 
spot and future market also follows a random walk process in all the sub periods. It is worth 
noticing that the critical value from period 1990 – 2000 is closer to rejection. This may 
indicate that the prices have become more efficient recent years. It is necessary to stress that 
we reject the hypothesis with a 5 percent probability. There is a possibility for type I and type 
II errors in our analysis. A type I error occurs when one rejects the null hypothesis when it is 
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true and a type II error occurs when one fails to reject the null hypothesis when the alternative 
hypothesis is true. There is a possibility that our results are a type II error.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
As mentioned earlier it is important to accommodate for OPEC’s strong market position. 
OPEC has significant market power and may therefore be able to affect the oil price, to their 
advantage. In a market situation with a price leader and a competitive fringe, we will not 
expect the market to be efficient though. If the cartel has the possibility to influence the price 
setting, the prices will not be a result of Adam Smith´s invisible hand, and truly are the 
markets not efficient. However, the price changes due to changes in production volume of 
OPEC will though not be absorbed in our models of testing for efficiency. We find in our 
analysis that the prices follow a random walk process, thus are weak form efficient. OPECs 
changes in production quotas will in our model just be shifts in the price pattern as other 
news, such as wars, disasters etc. that have influence on the oil price.  
 
We will state that participant outside OPEC does not have the possibilities to predict the 
future crude oil prices. On the other hand, we don’t know opportunities OPEC members have 
to do so. This is contrary to the efficiency concept and we are aware of that this is an 
important factor even if our data set does not capture OPEC’s position.    
 
5.1.3 Cointegration 
 
Since spot and futures prices have unit roots we would expect that the residuals also have a 
non-stationary behavior. Though, are the residuals stationary, then the spot and futures prices 
are cointergrated. While spot and futures prices might signiﬁcantly diverge over the life of the 
futures contract, futures prices have to converge to spot prices once the contract expires. But, 
in the long-run, it can be argued that spot and futures prices are driven by the same 
fundamentals, such as interest rates, macroeconomic variables and oil reserves, because 
futures prices represent expectations of the future spot prices of the physical commodity. For 
this reason we should expect spot and futures prices for any commodity to be linked through a 
long-run equilibrium relationship. This relationship can be tested by examining whether spot 
and futures prices are cointegrated. Granger (1986) claims that if two pairs of prices are 
cointegrated, they cannot be jointly efficient.    
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Cointegration test 
 
Constant Constant & trend 
      
1987 – 2010  -6.284** -6.332** 
   1990 – 2000 -4.866** -4.971** 
2000 – 2007 -4.674** -4.699** 
2007 – 2010 -3.052* -3.159 
Table 5.4: Residual’s critical values from the cointegration test. *implies that the values are significant on a 5% 
level, ** implies that the values are significant on a 1% level.  
 
From table 5.4 we see that we reject the null hypothesis at 5% significance level that the 
residuals follow a random walk process for all periods. We thereby conclude that the crude oil 
spot and futures prices are cointergrated. If we include a trend in the model, we see that we 
cannot conclude that there exists a cointegration relationship between the two prices from 
2007-2010. This indicates that the prices will be jointly efficient in this period because they 
tend to not follow the same pattern. We must however take into consideration that this result 
is based on a limited number of observations. Previously in our analysis we found that the 
spot and future prices are following a random walk process and we conclude that the prices 
are efficient in a weak-form. We find with the cointgration test that the spot and futures prices 
are not jointly efficient. This means that there exist a prediction factor and this can isolated be 
viewed upon as a weakness to the price efficiency. However, Dwyers and Wallace (1992) find 
that there is no general equivalence between the existence of arbitrage opportunities and 
cointegration. We therefore mean that the results from cointegration test are not strong 
enough to reject the hypothesis that the prices are efficient. Both prices are individually weak-
form efficient, but not jointly efficient because there exist a long term equilibrium.  
 
5.1.4 Error correction model 
 
We have now found that there is a long-term equilibrium between the markets and would 
continue to test how quickly deviations from this equilibrium are adjusted. We will therefore 
adopt a misalignment model in the form of ECM. The advantage of this model is that it 
contains both short-and long-term factors. In addition, the standard regression techniques are 
valid if cointegration exists, since all the processes in the model are stationary. If the two 
markets are cointegrated the trend effect for each market will cancel out. (Koop, 2007) 
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Error Correction Model 
           
   Coefficients 1.076** -0.092** 
   Table 5.5: Shows the results for the error correction model between WTI spot and WTI futures for the entire 
period. *significant at 5% level, **significant at 1% level. 
 
The results from the error correction model are shown above in table 5.5. The coefficient on 
    of -0.092 measures how much the spot price responds to equilibrium errors. The 
coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero. This implicates that model is out 
of its equilibrium error, but moves towards it. A positive error will cause a fall in the spot 
price. Assuming a equilibrium error of 1 dollar and everything else remain the same, tends the 
spot price to fall 9,2 cents the next period. This must be considered as a slow adjustment to 
equilibrium error. The coefficient on     is estimated to be 1,076. Assuming everything 
remains the same but an increase in the futures price of 1 dollar, the ECM implies that the 
spot price would instantly increase by 1,076 dollars. As we expected, price changes in the 
futures market will respond quickly in the spot prices and vice versa. The result supports the 
weak-form efficiency hypothesis, since the price changes will be absorbed quickly in the 
markets and cannot be used as forecasting estimates.    
 
5.1.5 Summary Efficiency market hypothesis 
 
Through our efficiency analysis of the oil prices we concluded with weak form efficiency.  
The prices were efficient for the whole period (1987-2010) and also for the three sub periods 
we tested. Our analysis does not accommodate for a cartel operating in the market. We saw 
that there existed a cointegration relationship between the spot and the future price. This 
means that the two markets will tend to fluctuate towards a long-run equilibrium. The error 
correction model showed that the changes in the futures prices were quickly adjusted in the 
spot price and therefore supports the weak-form efficiency hypothesis.  
The results from the different methods used in this section signalize that there are no arbitrage 
opportunities, and prices cannot be predicted unless you have inside information.    
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5.2 Hedging strategies 
 
From the previous chapter we found that the crude oil price and future price seemed to be 
efficient. Based on these findings we want to carry on with testing different hedging 
strategies. We divide this chapter in two sections. The first section looks only towards the 
price risk. We include three different strategies: 1) Minimum variance hedging method 2) 
Naïve hedging method and 3) Sharpe hedging method. In section two we look at price and 
exchange rate risk hedging strategies. We here include 1) Naïve hedging method 2) Separate 
hedging method and 3) Complex hedging method. By analyzing the different strategies we 
want to investigate if some methods are more efficient in a risk management process. This is 
done by looking at the hedge ratio and comparing the hedge effectiveness in each strategy. 
We will also compare risk and returns to calculate which strategy that is most suitable for an 
oil company based on risk aversion in the management.    
To simplify our analysis we need to make some assumptions. We do not include transaction 
costs, neither the include cost of carry. We also assume that the participants have access to the 
same information and that both long and short positions are permitted.  These are relevant and 
may affect our results to some extent.   
 
5.2.1 Minimum variance hedge ratio 
 
We will estimate the minimum variance hedge ratios by OLS regressions. The following 
regression used to find the estimated hedge ratio is: 
(St – St-1) = α + h*(Ft – Ft-1) + εt    (5.1) 
St and Ft are spot and futures prices at time t. α is constant, h* is the optimal hedge ratio and εt 
is the error term. We know the prices are non-stationary, but since the prices are differenced 
once, we avoid spurious regressions. 
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Minimum variance hedge ratios 
Year Hedge ratio, h* HE=R
2
 σ∆S σ∆F F test
 
1987 - 2010 1,077** 0,899 1,846 1,625 1,291** 
1987 0,978** 0,800 0,553 0,505 1,195 
1988 0,969** 0,842 0,607 0,577 1,104 
1989 1,150** 0,639 0,656 0,456 2,072** 
1990 1,257** 0,902 2,072 1,566 1,752* 
1991 0,919** 0,667 0,852 0,754 1,277 
1992 1,131** 0,933 0,449 0,384 1,366 
1993 1,100** 0,891 0,481 0,415 1,345 
1994 1,252** 0,903 0,594 0,452 1,731* 
1995 1,242** 0,730 0,441 0,298 2,185** 
1996 1,395** 0,612 1,038 0,594 3,049** 
1997 1,143** 0,927 0,639 0,554 1,330 
1998 1,197** 0,813 0,794 0,599 1,757* 
1999 1,191** 0,854 0,736 0,573 1,649* 
2000 1,238** 0,828 1,600 1,189 1,810* 
2001 1,078** 0,844 1,162 0,981 1,402 
2002 1,084** 0,857 1,030 0,853 1,458 
2003 1,118** 0,840 1,449 1,224 1,402 
2004 1,017** 0,913 1,598 1,499 1,136 
2005 1,074** 0,896 1,944 1,728 1,266 
2006 1,018** 0,908 2,050 1,899 1,165 
2007 1,083** 0,929 2,609 2,300 1,287 
2008 1,075** 0,969 5,478 4,991 1,205 
2009 1,024** 0,796 3,303 2,958 1,247 
2010 1,074** 0,991 2,708 2,589 1,094 
Table 5.6: Shows hedge ratios and R
2
 derived from regression of weekly data crude oil. h* is tested if it is 
significantly different from zero. The F-test tests whether the variances of changes in spot and futures prices are 
equal, or if variance changes in spot prices are larger. *significant at 5% level, **significant at 1% level.  
 
The yearly results of hedge ratios with respect to minimum variance, give static hedge ratios 
that fluctuate from the lowest ratio in 1991 at 0,919 to the highest ratio in 1996 at 1,395 based 
on weekly data. For the whole period 1987 – 2010 the static hedge ratio is 1,077. The results 
are close to one, and it looks similar to the naïve hedge. However, when testing the whole 
sample with respect to hedge ratio equal the naïve hedge of one, the results of 1,077 is 
statistical significant different from 1,000 at 1% level.  
The interpretation of α from regression is that α is the cost difference in spot and futures 
markets. α is not significantly different from zero in any of the regression and therefore not 
included in the table 5.6. There does not seem to be any cost differences in the two markets.    
The R
2
 from the regression is the portfolios hedging effectiveness, HE. The direct 
interpretation of the hedging effectiveness is how much of the change in spot prices can be 
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explained by the changes in the futures prices. Hull (2009) defines the hedging effectiveness 
as the proportion of the variance that is eliminated by hedging. A hedging effectiveness that is 
equal to one means that the portfolio value remains the same. If the portfolio value remains 
the same, we say that the hedge is perfect.  
We observe from table 5.6 that the hedging effectiveness for the entire period is 0,899 which 
indicate that a hedge with 3 months futures contracts at hedge ratio 1,077 is close to a perfect 
hedge. A perfect hedge is obtained when the hedging effectiveness is equal one. The observed 
hedging effectiveness is roughly between 0,8 and 0,9 according to the regressions. The 
hedging effectiveness of 1996 stands out as the lowest. This year also have highest hedging 
ratio in the sample and we observe a significant difference in the variance of the prices 
changes. An explanation for this could be that Saudi Arabia in 1996 increased its production 
(Pirog, 2005). This could have influenced the spot price, but the market probably expected 
this just to be temporary and the changes in prices could therefore have been lower in the 
futures market.  
The null hypothesis from the F-test in table 5.6 is that the standard deviations for spot and 
futures price changes are equal, with the alternative hypothesis that standard deviation for 
changes in spot prices are larger. For most individual years from year 2000, the standard 
deviations for changes in spot and futures prices are not significantly different. Although, do 
we look at the entire period, we find that the volatility of the changes in spot prices are higher 
in futures prices.  
The reason why it is interesting to look at standard deviation of price changes is because it 
will tells us if the two prices changes with same direction and amount and thereby will be able 
to use a naïve hedge. We have interviewed an oil companies in Norway, and they are in 
general using the naïve hedge strategy in their trading. The naïve hedging strategy is very 
simple to follow and could be cost efficient in form of reduced analysis costs.  
A weakness in our model of finding the minimum variance hedge ratio is that the model is 
static. The model weights all observations equally. A better approach would probably be to 
use a dynamic model. Kroner and Sultan (1993) use a bivariate GARCH error correction 
model to estimate the hedge ratio in a dynamic approach.  
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5.2.2 Sharpe hedge ratio 
 
In contrast to the minimum variance hedging strategy, it is interesting to look at a method 
which focuses on maximizing the return per unit risk. This can be computed using the Sharpe 
ratio. By using this method we want to investigate whether the hedge ratio will be more 
effective than a method that focuses solely on the risk of the portfolio.   
In our calculations we need an estimate of the risk free rate. Since our data are in US dollars 
we choose the risk free rate in the US (T-bill). Since the oil producing companies often 
choose to use short contracts in their strategy we choose the 3 month Treasury bill. We find 
the interest rate to be 0,15%. On a weekly basis this is 0,038%. Even if this holds up in our 
analysis some might argue that the risk free rate should include a rate over a longer time 
horizon. We are aware of the fact and realize that our results would be different if we would 
implement this in our model.  
An investor should, in periods with negative Sharpe ratio, place his assets in a risk free 
position or in another market (stock market, bonds etc.). For an oil producing company this is 
however impossible since they always need to trade their oil in the market. An alternative is to 
store the oil until the market has recovered from a downturn. Statoil has now the opportunity 
to do this in a bigger scale because of expanded capacity at Mongstad. It is however 
expansive to rent storages for the oil and this is not an optimal solution in the long run. 
 
When we calculated the hedge ratio using the Sharpe ratio, we discovered some disturbing 
results. In some years the Sharpe ratio was minimized instead of being maximized. These 
hedge ratios are useless since they do not satisfy the Sharpe model.   
Hedging Effectiveness 
Year HE min var HE Sharpe HE naive 
1987 - 2010 0.822 (1.08) 0.585 (1.71) 0.814 (1.00) 
Table 5.7: Contains the hedging effectiveness for the three methods used. The hedging ratio is shown in the 
parentheses. 
 
From table 5.7 we see that the hedging effectiveness also is lowest for the Sharpe method. 
Since the crude oil price is so volatile it is very difficult to choose a good active strategy over 
a longer time period. A company that bases its strategy on the Sharpe ratio would therefore 
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need to use a lot of resources trying to time the cycles in the crude oil market. The results 
from the Sharpe method might be a result of OPEC’s production quotas. The Sharpe method 
is based on perfect markets and as mentioned earlier, OPEC can be a possible reason to 
market imperfections. Our analysis does not capture this, but it could be interesting to test for 
in further work.   
We observe that the minimum variance method has the highest hedging effectiveness and is 
therefore the best alternative for a hedging strategy if the management focuses solely on risk. 
This strategy is, however, based on a changing hedge ratio from a year to year basis. We see 
that the naïve hedge (1:1) gives a hedging effectiveness close to the minimum variance 
method. This method would be easier to implement in a business strategy, since it does not 
require time and resources to find the optimal hedge ratio every year. This is also a result we 
see some of the big oil companies use in their strategy today.  
 
5.2.3 Risk aversion 
 
As we have stated earlier in this thesis, the company is risk neutral in a general perspective 
and the owners are risk averse. We also mentioned that the real world often differs from 
theory and therefore management might have incentives to hedge the production. In the 
highlight of this we want to illustrate the hedge ratio compared to the risk aversion in this 
chapter. The point of view here applies to a risk averse management/manager or a single 
investor that operates in the crude oil market.     
 
From financial theory it is known that investors make their decisions based on their degree of 
risk aversion. It would be wrong to conclude that a strategy that yields higher return would be 
better even if the risk is higher. It is therefore important to interpret our results in the light of 
the risk aversion parameter A, as mentioned in section 2.5.3, equation (2.16). From figure 5.1, 
we can see how the hedge ratio varies with the different levels of A with the mean variance 
method.    
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Figure 5.1: Illustrates the balance between risk aversion and optimal hedging ratio.  
 
We observe that when an investor has a risk aversion parameter equal to 0.8, the hedge ratio 
will be 0 and indicate that he will only act in the spot market. We also register that when A 
becomes relatively high (A > 20) the hedge ratio will be equal to the hedge ratio we found by 
using the minimum variance method (1,077). 
 
It is however difficult to find a correct value for A. If we were to calculate the A, we would 
have to collect the different values for A from all investors in the oil market. It is however 
common known that the average risk parameter have a value equal to 2. This would imply a 
hedge ratio of 0.63.  
 
5.2.4 Multiple risk factors hedging strategy 
 
“Fluctuating foreign exchange rates can have a significant impact on our operating results. 
Our revenues and cash flows are mainly denominated in, or driven by US dollars, while our 
operating expenses and income taxes payable largely accrue in NOK”.(Statoil, 2009) 
 
At last we will look at a trading company who is in addition to the risk of prices in crude oil 
market, also is exposed to exchange rate risk. This is not relevant for an oil producing 
company if it has all its income and costs in one currency. It is however a more relevant issue 
-10,00
-8,00
-6,00
-4,00
-2,00
0,00
2,00
0
,1
0
,3
0
,5
0
,7
0
,9
1
,1
1
,3
1
,5
1
,7
1
,9
2
,1
2
,3
2
,5
2
,7
2
,9
3
,1
3
,3
3
,5
3
,7
3
,9
4
,1
4
,3
4
,5
4
,7
4
,9 2
0
2
0
0
H
e
d
ge
 r
at
io
Hedge ratio/risk aversion
Risk aversion
53 
 
for a country or company that have a larger proportion of revenues or costs in a foreign 
currency. 
In order to get an overview of the oil price and the exchange rate risk we graph the WTI spot 
price in USD and NOK indexed, where both starts at a value of 100. The result is shown in 
figure 5.2. We observe that the two lines follow each other closely most of the period. Overall 
it seems that PPP holds for crude oil in US dollars and NOK. However, we notice that the two 
lines differ from each other from 2000-2002 and again from 2007-2009. These periods can 
signalize that the PPP does not hold. This is an interesting finding and we therefore want to 
see if we can get a better hedging strategy by including the exchange rate risk in a more 
advanced model which takes the exchange rate risk into consideration.  
 
Figure 5.2: Shows indexed values of the WTI spot price in USD and NOK where both starts at 100 in 1987. 
 
The first step is to calculate the optimal hedging ratio and hedging effectiveness by looking 
only at the exchange rate risk. 
 
Exchange rate risk (USD/NOK) 
In our process of estimating the optimal hedge ratio for the exchange rates we use the 
minimum variance ratio as before. We now change our input with numbers for the USD/NOK 
ratio. We use 3 month future contracts in our data set.  
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From figure 4.2 we have observed the historical exchange rates of USD/NOK. The average 
exchange rate is 6,9 USD/NOK with a standard deviation of 0,9 during the past 20 years. 
Meese and Rogoff (1983) found that no prediction models of exchange rates were able to be 
beat a random walk model and this result has also been reinforced in later studies. This 
implies that the market follows a random walk process. If we believe that crude oil prices and 
exchange rates cannot be predicted, a risk strategy is essential for a risk averse management in 
order to deal in markets with high volatility.  
 
Combined risk 
 
In figure 5.2 we observe that the two lines follow each other closely in the beginning of the 
data set, but that there are some major differences and especially in the latest years during the 
financial crisis. This indicates that there is a certain risk factor that can be a potential problem 
if you are concerned about the exchange rates in the trading. In general we observe that the 
indexed USD crude oil price is higher than the indexed NOK crude oil price. Analyzing 
further, we observe that the standard deviation of the indexed USD crude oil price is 32,7, 
while for NOK it is only 22,1 for the whole period. These results may be a sign of an overall 
reduced risk for a Norwegian crude oil trader due to the negative correlation between 
USD/NOK and WTI crude oil price.   
 
There has been done much research on the relationship between crude oil price and US 
dollars. Lizardo and Mollick (2010) find that an increase in real oil prices will lead to a 
significant depreciation of US dollars against currencies of oil exporting nations, such as 
Canada, Russia and Mexico, and that US dollar will lead relative to an appreciation to oil 
import currencies, such as Japan.  
 
Analysis 
Our analysis takes as a starting point the research of Yun and Kim (2010). Their study looks 
at Korean oil traders risk, where crude oil price and the exchange rates of Korean Won and 
U.S. dollars. In our study, we will take a Norwegian oil traders point of view, and look at the 
exchange rate risk of U.S. dollars (USD) and Norwegian Kroner (NOK).    
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For the separate model, we will estimate the hedge ratios with same approach as with 
minimum variance above, just with some modifications. For the crude oil futures we will 
transform the prices into NOK instead of USD. The data will also be on monthly basis. The 
regression of the separate crude oil futures hedge ratio,   
 , is as follow: 
                       
                     (5.2) 
where et is the spot exchange rate. The exchange futures separate hedge ratio,    
 , is estimated 
by: 
                
                (5.3) 
where et and xt is spot and futures of exchange rate.   
We must perform multiple regressions to derive the estimated hedge ratios for the complex 
model. Hij is estimated by the regression: 
              ,    (5.4) 
 where j=1,2,3; k=1,2, there                                and  
                   
 
This gives us six regressions to carry out:  
                                            (5.5) 
                                      (5.6) 
                                       (5.7) 
                                  (5.8) 
                                           (5.9) 
                                      (5.10) 
The estimated Hij are used to obtain estimations of the hedge ratios     
        
   in section 
2.5.5.  
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To be able to compare the different hedging strategies, we will again use hedging 
effectiveness. We cannot now use the R-squared from regressions since we are dealing with 
portfolios. The hedging effectiveness of the portfolio is estimated by: 
     
       
       
      (5.11) 
where VAR(rH) is the variance of the return to the hedged portfolio, while VAR(rU) is the 
variance of the unhedged portfolio. (Ederington, 1979)  
 
Hedge ratios including exchange rate risk 
  Naive Separate  Complex 
Year h Oil h USD/NOK HE    
     
  HE      
     
  HE  
1987 - 2010 1,00 1,00 0,88 1,05 1,00 0,89 1,07 -0,06 0,95 
1987 1,00 1,00 0,70 0,98 1,02 0,71 0,98 0,03 0,71 
1988 1,00 1,00 0,75 1,01 0,98 0,75 1,00 -0,03 0,77 
1989 1,00 1,00 0,70 1,23 1,04 0,65 1,23 -0,13 0,71 
1990 1,00 1,00 0,77 1,23 1,00 0,79 1,20 -0,74 0,82 
1991 1,00 1,00 0,76 1,20 1,00 0,61 1,06 -0,24 0,80 
1992 1,00 1,00 0,62 1,12 0,98 0,52 1,09 -0,18 0,83 
1993 1,00 1,00 0,80 1,07 1,03 0,78 1,07 -0,08 0,81 
1994 1,00 1,00 0,75 1,33 1,00 0,77 1,36 -0,11 0,79 
1995 1,00 1,00 0,86 1,16 0,98 0,79 1,16 -0,05 0,81 
1996 1,00 1,00 0,68 1,40 0,98 0,64 1,41 -0,38 0,67 
1997 1,00 1,00 0,75 1,14 1,01 0,73 1,12 -0,22 0,83 
1998 1,00 1,00 0,71 1,05 0,99 0,72 1,16 0,39 0,71 
1999 1,00 1,00 0,81 1,22 0,99 0,79 1,23 0,03 0,79 
2000 1,00 1,00 0,77 1,21 1,00 0,70 1,33 -1,14 0,84 
2001 1,00 1,00 0,57 0,97 0,99 0,58 0,93 -0,82 0,75 
2002 1,00 1,00 0,80 0,97 0,99 0,81 0,98 0,14 0,79 
2003 1,00 1,00 0,81 1,18 0,99 0,78 1,18 -0,04 0,79 
2004 1,00 1,00 0,87 1,10 1,00 0,85 1,09 0,29 0,83 
2005 1,00 1,00 0,79 1,01 1,00 0,79 1,00 -0,03 0,80 
2006 1,00 1,00 0,67 1,02 1,00 0,67 0,95 -0,26 0,83 
2007 1,00 1,00 0,68 1,02 0,99 0,70 0,93 -0,19 0,80 
2008 1,00 1,00 0,80 1,02 1,01 0,81 1,07 0,05 0,81 
2009 1,00 1,00 0,70 1,07 0,98 0,70 1,04 -0,38 0,77 
Table 5.8: Summary of hedge ratios (h) for oil futures and exchange rates and the hedging effectiveness (HE) for 
naïve hedging strategy and minimum variance hedging strategy for respectively separate and complex model.   
 
57 
 
From table 5.8, we see that the results from the separate crude oil futures hedge with monthly 
data are similar to the weekly data. The fact that the OLS is only based on 12 observations is 
though a weakness to our model, but all hedge ratios are statistical different from zero at a 1% 
significant level. Also monthly data of crude oil for the whole sample have a hedge ratio that 
is statistically significantly different from one at a 1% significance level. The yearly estimated 
hedge ratios are also close to the ones estimated with weekly data.  
For USD/NOK exchange rates, the hedge rate for the whole sample is not statistical 
significant different from one at a 5% significance level, and equals the naïve hedge. This 
seems to be applicable for the estimated hedge ratios for all years.  
Comparing the separate model strategy to the naïve hedging strategy, they both seem to be 
practically equal in the hedge ratios and hedging effectiveness. This means that it wasted use 
of resources to calculate a separate hedging model. We also observed that in about half of the 
estimated hedging effectiveness of the naïve hedging strategy is better than the separate 
model. These results contradict with the results of Lien et al. (2008).   
For the complex model, we observe that hedge ratio for crude oil futures,     
 , are similar to 
the separate model.  However, hedge ratio with concern to exchange futures,    
 , are 
remarkably different. We observe that the overall hedge ratio for currency is negative. This 
means that the complex model suggests that the trading company should instead of sell 
exchange futures, buy exchange futures. Seen isolated, this will increase the trader’s risk in 
the exchange rate market, but limit the risk of the portfolio. These results are similar to the 
findings of Yum and Kim (2010) which use Korean Won, KRW, instead of NOK.  
The hedging effectiveness for the complex model is in general better than the two other 
strategies. 1999 and 2004 distinguish where the naïve strategy beats both of the two models in 
hedging effectiveness. Although the hedging effectiveness of the complex model seems to be 
best choice, it is not superior in all years. These results differs some from Yun and Kim 
(2010) who found the complex model to be superior in all periods.  
Do we look at the hedging effectiveness in times of crisis, there does not seems to be any 
noteworthy differences in hedge ratios and hedging effectiveness compared to other years. 
To get a broader perspective of the three hedging strategies, we will in table 5.10 look at the 
added returns and standard deviations compared to the unhedged portfolio. 
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Added returns and standard deviation for the different hedging strategies 
  Only Spot (Unhedged) Naïve Separate  Complex 
Year Return  St.dev Return  St.dev Return St.dev Return St.dev 
1987 - 2009 4,7 % 25,6 % 0,48 % 15,2 % -2,24 % 15,7 % 0,52 % 12,0 % 
1987 -28 % 22 % 5 % 13 % -2 % 13 % 0 % 12 % 
1988 -3 % 21 % 2 % 13 % -2 % 13 % 0 % 10 % 
1989 28 % 19 % -5 % 12 % -2 % 14 % 0 % 10 % 
1990 12 % 52 % 17 % 26 % -1 % 25 % 2 % 23 % 
1991 -28 % 34 % -12 % 22 % -6 % 26 % 0 % 16 % 
1992 8 % 14 % -10 % 14 % -4 % 15 % 0 % 6 % 
1993 -19 % 19 % -12 % 12 % -2 % 12 % 0 % 8 % 
1994 9 % 19 % 13 % 11 % -2 % 11 % 0 % 9 % 
1995 3 % 19 % 12 % 10 % -2 % 12 % 0 % 8 % 
1996 30 % 24 % 0 % 14 % -1 % 15 % 1 % 14 % 
1997 -21 % 19 % -19 % 13 % -3 % 13 % 1 % 8 % 
1998 -43 % 20 % -9 % 12 % -1 % 12 % 0 % 11 % 
1999 89 % 26 % 6 % 13 % -2 % 14 % 0 % 12 % 
2000 21 % 37 % -14 % 20 % -4 % 23 % 1 % 18 % 
2001 -40 % 21 % -7 % 15 % -2 % 15 % 2 % 11 % 
2002 20 % 27 % 28 % 14 % -2 % 14 % 0 % 12 % 
2003 2 % 31 % 6 % 18 % -4 % 19 % 0 % 14 % 
2004 21 % 30 % 6 % 13 % -2 % 14 % 0 % 13 % 
2005 41 % 22 % -10 % 11 % -2 % 11 % 0 % 9 % 
2006 -4 % 18 % 7 % 15 % -3 % 15 % 1 % 8 % 
2007 28 % 18 % 15 % 13 % -2 % 13 % 1 % 8 % 
2008 -56 % 46 % -39 % 27 % -3 % 26 % 1 % 20 % 
2009 40 % 31 % 30 % 19 % -1 % 18 % 2 % 16 % 
Table 5.9: Shows annual added returns and standard deviation for the different hedging strategies based on 
monthly data in NOK. 1987-2009 is an average of the data from all years. 
As we expected, the total average standard deviation is reduced for all hedging strategies 
compared to the unhedged portfolio. The unhedged consists only of spot crude oil prices and 
spot exchange rates. We see that the added returns on the unhedged portfolio are greater than 
the hedged ones. The average annual added returns on the unhedged portfolio are 4,70%.  
One of the most interesting finding in our research, is the hedging effectiveness in terms of 
return. As we can see from table 5.9, the added returns of the complex hedge for all years are 
close to zero. Using this model, the value of the portfolio remains the same, which implicates 
practically a perfect hedge.  
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Looking at the period of Financial crisis, we observe that the return of the unhedged portfolio 
is -56% in 2008. The naïve hedge takes away some of the volatility, and have some lower 
loss. However, the complex model actually gives profit in the same period.  
 
Figure 5.3: Illustrates the historical performance of each strategy from 1987 to 2010.  
 
The choice of strategy is matter of the overall business situation. A company capable of 
taking risk will in the long run probably profit from not hedging, but risks big losses in some 
periods. If we assume that the prices follow a random walk, it is not possible to predict the 
future prices. For a company that requires a strong fixed control of income or costs, a hedging 
strategy should be appropriate. Figure 5.3 provides a graphical view of the strategies, and as 
we see the complex hedge is the best in concern of risk. On the other side, spot has a higher 
expected added return, but a higher risk.  
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5.2.5 Summery hedging strategies 
 
We find a close relation between the naïve hedge and the minimum variance hedge ratio. It 
seems to be possible to remain a relatively high hedging effectiveness regardless of the 
volatility in the market. We find the Sharpe model to be inappropriate for hedging purposes. 
This may be a consequence of imperfect markets.   
In the case of multiple risk factors hedging strategy, we find that it is actually possible to 
achieve a hedging effectiveness that is close to a perfect hedge. A company that finds it 
necessary to hedge price and exchange rate risks should use the complex model.  
If a company chooses to hedge, it should either be risk averse or hedge in speculative 
purposes.   
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6 Discussion of assumptions, limitations and improvements 
 
In this thesis we have looked at three month futures contracts as the only instrument to hedge 
the oil price. There are more alternatives than this. It is also possible to use forward contracts 
and options in the companies hedging strategies. There are also other futures contracts with 
different time horizon. On NYMEX you can trade future contracts with maturity from 1 
month to long horizon contracts (3 to 6 years). This could have affected our results and maybe 
we could have discovered a better hedging strategy with a mix of different contracts and time 
horizons. This would however be much more time consuming and difficult to interpret.   
As an alternative to use futures contracts, an oil company could invest in a commodity index 
to remove more of the unsystematic risk. We have not included such an index in our thesis, 
but it could have been interesting to compare the performance of this index with the hedging 
strategies we have used.   
Our analysis does not correct for the tailing problem. This implies that the gains or losses 
from daily settlement in the futures market are not taken into consideration. This becomes a 
weakness in our thesis since our data do not capture this problem. (Hull, 2009) 
When we carry out with different hedging strategies we do not consider the different types of 
oil companies. The so called big-oil companies are integrated which means that they operates 
both upstream and downstream. With the upstream we mean exploration and production, 
while downstream is what we characterize as refining and distribution. There are also 
differences between oil companies in financing and diversification. Big-oil companies have 
often very low share of debt compared to equity with some exceptions. Big-oil companies 
also operate in many countries worldwide and are therefore less vulnerable for political 
disturbance.  
Based on the fact that oil companies are different it is a bit premature to conclude that one 
strategy should hold for all. A smaller company might not have the opportunity to run the risk 
of not hedging when the oil price is low. As mentioned earlier, this was the case with SAGA 
Petroleum. 
In the calculations of the different hedging strategies we do not include the transaction cost of 
trading in the crude oil market. These costs might affect our results to some extent.  
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7 Conclusion 
 
In this thesis we have analyzed price movements in the crude oil market in the period 1987 - 
2010 and possible strategies for hedging. We have investigated whether the prices is weak-
form efficient. The hedging strategies we use are naïve, minimum variance and Sharpe. Price 
and exchange rate risk has been considered.  
Through our efficiency analysis of the crude oil prices, we concluded with weak form 
efficiency in both the spot and the futures market. The prices were efficient for the entire 
period and also for the three sub periods we tested. These results were based on an 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots where we failed to reject the null hypothesis that 
the prices were following a random walk process. We have discussed the impact of OPEC in 
the market, but our tests were not strong enough to capture this effect. We find that the 
physical spot market and the financial futures market are cointegrated. This means that they 
move towards a long term equilibrium price. By conducting an error correction model (ECM) 
we found that the WTI spot and future prices seem to adjust quickly to price changes, but 
moves slowly towards the equilibrium error in the short run, which strengthens the efficiency 
hypothesis.    
We claim that it is not possible to predict the spot price, unless you have inside information. A 
risk averse management of a company should therefore consider implementing a hedging 
strategy.  
This thesis has focused on naïve and minimum variance hedging strategies. We have also 
looked at the use of a Sharpe model for hedging purposes. The main outcome from our 
analysis, looking at the price risk, is that the minimum variance almost equals the naïve. The 
hedging effectiveness is not remarkable better with a minimum variance hedging strategy, and 
because a naïve hedging strategy is easier to implement, we suggest using the naïve. This is 
also a strategy supported by the oil company we interviewed. We find the Sharpe model not to 
be suitable for risk management in the crude oil market.  
When we add the exchange rate risk in addition to the price risk, we observe similarity 
between the separate minimum variance and the naïve strategy. In relation to return and risk, 
the naïve is preferable. The complex model is however superior compared to the two other 
strategies. The complex model gives a hedging effectiveness close to a perfect hedge. The 
63 
 
complex model differs with the amount of exchange futures to hedge. The complex model 
suggests increasing the exchange rate risk in order to reduce the total risk of the portfolio.  
To summarize the different hedging strategies, it all boils down to a matter of risk 
willingness. We have not discovered a unique and superior hedging strategy, but we have 
established that the management should not try to time the cycles to make an excess return. 
The management of an oil company should buy and sell in the spot market if they are risk 
neutral. If the management on the other hand is dependent of a certain share of revenues and 
therefore are risk averse, they should implement a hedging strategy based on a one to one 
hedge. This strategy is easy to implement and ensure a relatively low volatility in periods with 
high turbulence. 
 
For future research we would find it interesting to look at price efficiency between every 
period OPEC sets its production quotas. We could then accommodate for the price leading 
function of OPEC. We would also suggest a development of a dynamic hedging model with 
multiple risk factors. A dynamic model focus stronger on newer observations compared to a 
static model which weight all data equally.  
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